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Abstract. We combine the parametric Barvinok algorithm with a generation algorithm for a finite list of suitably chosen
discrete sub-cases on the enumeration of complete simple games, i. e. a special subclass of monotone Boolean functions.
Recently, Freixas et al. have proven an enumeration formula for complete simple games with two types of voters. We will
provide a shorter proof and an enumeration formula for complete simple games with two shift-minimal winning coalitions.
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1. Introduction
Consider a yes-no voting system for a set of n voters.
The acceptance of a proposal should depend on the subset
of “yea” voters. In general, the acceptance may be described
by a Boolean function. There are several features that we
expect to be valid for a voting system. The most natural
feature is that a proposal being favored by a set Y of voters
will not be rejected if it is accepted with the support of a
subset Y ′ ⊆ Y of the voters. This directly leads us to the
class of monotone Boolean functions or simple games.
There are different concepts for the set of required features
of a voting system. One is that of a weighted majority game.
Here, we are given non-negative voting weights wi ∈ R≥0 for
the voters and a quota q ∈ R>0. A proposal is accepted if
and only if
∑
i∈Y
wi ≥ q, where Y is the set of voters in favor
of the proposal. Speaking informally, we can say that for a
pair of voters i and j with wi < wj , voter i has less influence
than voter j. The exact definition or measurement of “influ-
ence” is given by a desirability relation introduced by Isbell
in [19]. There are some cases for such desirability relations
which have no realization using non-negative real weights.
The class of all total desirability relations is called complete
simple games which is a natural extension of weighted ma-
jority games. For the other direction, it is well known that
each complete simple game can be represented as the inter-
section of k weighted majority games where the smallest such
number k is called the dimension, see [7].
The theory of simple games is a very active area of re-
search. For the broad variety of applications we quote Tay-
lor and Zwicker [34]: “Few structures arise in more contexts
and lend themselves to more diverse interpretations than do
simple games.”
The aim of this paper is to provide an algorithm to deter-
mine exact formulas for the number of non-isomorphic com-
plete simple games.
1.1. Related results. The enumeration of monotone Boolean
functions1 is sometimes called “Dedekind’s problem”. By
now, the numbers mb(n) of monotone Boolean functions are
known for n ≤ 8; they are 3, 6, 20, 168, 7 581, 7 828 354,
2 414 682 040 998, and 56 130 437 228 687 557 907 788 [24]. For
n = 9, it is only known that there are more than 1042 dif-
ferent antichains. Except an asymptotic formula [24] and a
computationally useless exact formula [22] nearly nothing is
known on the values mb(n).
If an additional parameter k is introduced, some exact
formulas for the number mb(n, k) of antichains of {1, . . . , n}
consisting of exactly k subsets can be deduced:
mb(n, 0) = 1,
mb(n, 1) = 2n,
mb(n, 2) = 2n ·
2n − 1
2
− 3n + 2n,
mb(n, 3) = 2n ·
(2n − 1) (2n − 2)
6
− 6n + 5n + 4n − 3n.
1or antichains
In [20] Kilibarda and Jovovic´ gave a general procedure for
calculating exact formulas for mb(n, k) where k is fixed and
have explicitly listed formulas for k ≤ 10. Roughly speak-
ing, they reduced the enumeration problem for mb(n, k) to
the enumeration of all connected bipartite graphs with fixed
numbers of vertices and edges, and with a given number of 2-
colorings of a certain type. A generalization of their method
is given in [21].
Unfortunately, the number k of elements of an antichain
of N can become quite large. Due to Sperner’s theorem, k
can vary between 0 and
(
n
⌊n2 ⌋
)
, see e. g. [9].
The authors of [17] have enumerated complete simple games
with one shift-minimal winning coalition. The number of
symmetric complete simple games is a classical result due to
May, see e. g. [18]. An exact formula for the number of com-
plete simple games with two types of voters was proven very
recently in [14, 16]
All weighted majority games up to 6 voters were enumer-
ated in [10, 29]. The enumeration for 7 voters was done in
[37] and for 8 voters we refer e. g. to [12, 13, 25, 30]. Some
special classes of complete simple games and weighted ma-
jority games were enumerated in [11, 17]. For asymptotic
bounds we refer to [39].
1.2. Our contribution. We provide a shorter proof (com-
pared to [14, 16]) for the enumeration of complete simple
games with two types of voters and an enumeration formula
for complete simple games with two shift-minimal winning
coalitions. Our main contribution is an algorithm (based on
the parametric Barvinok algorithm) to determine formulas
for the number of complete simple games with t types of vot-
ers and r shift-minimal winning coalitions in dependence of
the number of voters.
1.3. Outline of the Paper. In Section 2 we provide the
basic definitions for complete simple games concluding with a
parameterization, see Theorem 1. Section 3 is devoted to the
modeling process of complete simple games as integer points
in polytopes and a very brief introduction into lattice point
counting algorithms. Complete simple games with two types
of voters will be discussed in Section 4. Next we describe an
approach to determine enumeration formulas for the number
of complete simple games before we end with a conclusion in
Section 6.
2. Complete simple games
In this section we will define the crucial objects.
2.1. Simple games or monotone boolean functions.
Let N = {1, . . . , n} be a set of n voters. By 2N we denote
the set {U | U ⊂ N} of all subsets of N . The information
whether the support of a proposal by a subset Y of the vot-
ers suffices for its acceptance is condensed in a characteristic
function χ : 2N → {0, 1}.
Definition 1. A pair (N,χ) is called simple game if χ is
a characteristic function of the subsets of N with χ(∅) = 0,
χ(N) = 1, and χ(U ′) ≤ χ(U) for all U ′ ⊆ U .
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So, each simple game is a monotone Boolean function and
except for the all-zero function and the all-one function all
monotone Boolean functions are simple games. We will call
a subset U of the set of voters N a coalition.
Definition 2. A coalition U ⊆ N of a simple game (N,χ) is
called winning iff χ(U) = 1 and losing otherwise. By W we
denote the set {U | χ(U) = 1} of all winning coalitions and
by L the set {U | χ(U) = 0} of all losing coalitions.
Obviously, a simple game can be described by explicitly
listing all winning coalitions or all losing coalitions. Since
there are 2n subsets of N such a list could become quite
large even for rather small values of n. So far, the property
χ(U ′) ≤ χ(U) for all U ′ ⊆ U was not used to compress the
data.
Definition 3. A coalition U ⊆ N of a simple game (N,χ)
is called a minimal winning coalition iff χ(U) = 1 and
χ(U ′) = 0 for all U ′ ( U . It is called a maximal losing
coalition iff χ(U) = 0 and χ(U ′) = 1 for all U ( U ′. By W
we denote the set of all minimal winning coalitions and by L
the set of all maximal losing coalitions.
We remark that the knowledge of eitherW or L suffices to
reconstruct W , L, and χ. In [15] the complexity of changing
the representation form of a simple game is studied. Note
that the sets W and L are antichains, i. e. no two elements
are subsets of each other.
Example 1.
W =
{
{1, 2}, {1, 2, 3}, {1, 2, 4}, {1, 2, 3, 4}, {1, 3},
{1, 4}, {1, 3, 4}, {2, 3}, {2, 4}, {2, 3, 4}
}
So, there are 10 winning coalitions. Clearly we have L =
2N\W and |L| = 6. It is not hard to figure out the sets of
the minimal winning coalitions
W =
{
{1, 2}, {1, 3}, {1, 4}, {2, 3}, {2, 4}
}
and the maximal losing coalitions
L =
{
{1}, {2}, {3, 4}
}
.
2.2. Isbell’s desirability relation. As mentioned in the
introduction, the monotonicity of simple games is a very
weak requirement for voting systems. Now, we define the
desirability relation introduced by Isbell in [19] (using a dif-
ferent notation):
Definition 4. We write i ⊐ j (or j ⊏ i) for two voters
i, j ∈ N iff we have χ
(
{i}∪U\{j}
)
≤ χ(U) for all {j} ⊆ U ⊆
N\{i} and we abbreviate i ⊐ j, j ⊐ i by ij. A pair (N,χ) is
called complete simple game (also called a “directed game”,
see [25]) if it is a simple game and the binary relation ⊐ is a
total preorder, i. e.
(1) i ⊐ i for all i ∈ N ,
(2) either i ⊐ j or j ⊐ i (including “i ⊐ j and j ⊐ i”)
for all i, j ∈ N , and
(3) i ⊐ j, j ⊐ h implies i ⊐ h for all i, j, h ∈ N
holds. By cs(n) we denote the number of complete simple
games for n voters.
If i ⊐ j we say that voter i is at most as desirable as voter
j as a coalition partner. If ij then voter i is as desirable as
voter j as a coalition partner since χ(U∪{i}) = χ(U∪{j}) for
all U ⊆ N\{i, j}. To factor out some symmetry, we partition
the set of voters N into subsets N1, . . . , Nt such that we have
ij for all i, j ∈ Nh, where 1 ≤ h ≤ t, and ij implies the
existence of an integer 1 ≤ h ≤ t with i, j ∈ Nh. So in some
sense the sets Ni cover equally desirable voters. In Example
1 we have t = 2, N1 = {1, 2} and N2 = {3, 4}.
We would like to remark that this is also known in the field
of Boolean algebra as Winder’s preorder, see e. g. [28, 36, 38].
Given these classes of equally desirable voters we can fur-
ther compress the information on the minimal winning coali-
tions or maximal losing coalitions:
Definition 5. Let (N, χ) be a complete simple game and Ni
be the classes of equally desirable voters for 1 ≤ i ≤ t. We
call a vector m˜ :=
(
m1 . . . mt
)
, where 0 ≤ mi ≤ |Ni| for
1 ≤ i ≤ t, a winning coalition iff χ(U) = 1, where U is an
arbitrary subset of N containing exactly mi elements of Ni
for 1 ≤ i ≤ t. Analogously, we call such a vector a losing
coalition iff χ(U) = 0, where U is an arbitrary subset of N
containing exactly mi elements of Ni for 1 ≤ i ≤ t.
Due to the definition of the sets Ni the value of χ(U) does
only depend on m˜ and not on U . In Example 1 the winners
are given by{(
1 1
)
,
(
1 2
)
,
(
2 0
)
,
(
2 1
)
,
(
2 2
)}
and the losers are given by{(
0 0
)
,
(
0 1
)
,
(
0 2
)
,
(
1 0
)}
.
To factor out remaining symmetries, we require i ⊏ j for
i ∈ Nh1 , j ∈ Nh2 , where 1 ≤ h1 < h2 ≤ t, and
Ni =
{ i−1∑
j=1
|Nj |+ 1, . . . ,
i∑
j=1
|Nj |
}
,
which can always be achieved by rearranging the voters of a
given complete simple game. With this, it suffices to know
the cardinalities ni := |Ni| instead of the explicit sets Ni.
Definition 6. We call a pair (n˜, χ), where n˜ =
(
n1 . . . nt
)
with ni ∈ N>0 and
∑t
i=1 ni =: n, a complete simple game
if (N,χ) is a complete simple game and the Ni are the classes
of equally desirable voters for 1 ≤ i ≤ t, where N and the Ni
are given as stated above. By cs(n, t), we denote the num-
ber of complete simple games with t equivalence classes for n
voters.
To carry over the concept of minimal winning coalitions
and maximal losing coalitions to vectors, we need a partial
ordering:
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Definition 7. For two vectors a˜ =
(
a1 . . . at
)
and b˜ =(
b1 . . . bt
)
we write a˜  b˜ if and only if we have
k∑
i=1
ai ≤
k∑
i=1
bi
for all 1 ≤ k ≤ t. For a˜  b˜ and a˜ 6= b˜ we use a˜ ≺ b˜ as
an abbreviation. If neither a˜  b˜ nor b˜  a˜ holds we write
a˜ ⊲⊳ b˜.
In words, we say that a˜ is smaller than b˜ if a˜ ≺ b˜ and that
a˜ and b˜ are incomparable if a˜ ⊲⊳ b˜. For some background on
this partial ordering in the literature, we refer the interested
reader to [13]. Like any partial order,  can be depicted
by a Hasse diagram or a directed graph. In Figure 2.2 we
have drawn the Hasse diagram for Example 1. In such a
Hasse diagram or directed graph, we have a˜  b˜ if there is a
(possibly empty) directed path from a˜ to b˜. We have a˜ ⊲⊳ b˜
if there is neither a directed path from a˜ to b˜ nor from b˜ to
a˜.
(
0 0
)
(
0 1
)
(
1 0
) (
0 2
)
(
1 1
)
(
2 0
) (
1 2
)
(
2 1
)
(
2 2
)
✻
◗
◗❦
✑
✑✸
✑
✑✸
◗
◗❦
◗
◗❦
✑
✑✸
✑
✑✸
◗
◗❦
✻
Figure 1. The Hasse diagram for  on (2 2).
With Definition 7 at hand, we can define:
Definition 8. A vector m˜ :=
(
m1 . . . mt
)
in a complete
simple game
( (
n1 . . . nt
)
, χ
)
is a minimal winning
coalition2 iff m˜ is a winning coalition and every coalition
m˜′ ≺ m˜ is losing. Analogously, a coalition m˜ is a maxi-
mal losing coalition3 iff m˜ is a losing coalition and every
coalition m˜′ ≻ m˜ is winning.
The minimal winning coalitions of Example 1 are given
by {(
1 1
)}
2Sometimes we more precisely speak of shift-minimal winning
coalitions.
3Similarly we also speak of shift-maximal losing coalitions.
and the maximal losing coalitions are given by{(
1 0
)
,
(
0 2
)}
,
which both are quite short lists. Thus, a complete simple
game can be represented by a vector
n˜ =
(
n1 . . . nt
)
and a matrix
M =

m1,1 m1,2 . . . m1,t
m2,1 m2,2 . . . m2,t
...
. . .
. . .
...
mr,1 mr,2 . . . mr,t
 =

m˜1
m˜2
...
m˜r

of all minimal winning coalitions m˜i. In Example 1 we have
n˜ =
(
2 2
)
and M =
(
1 1
)
. In general, this is a very
compact representation of a complete simple game and we
will use it in the remaining part of the paper.
In order to state an isomorphism-free parameterization of
complete simple games, we need another total ordering, the
so-called lexicographic ordering:
Definition 9. For two vectors a˜ =
(
a1 . . . at
)
and b˜ =(
b1 . . . bt
)
we write a˜⋗ b˜ if and only if there is an integer
1 ≤ h ≤ t such that ai = bi for i < h and ah > bh.
and a specification when we consider two complete simple
games to be isomorphic:
Definition 10. Two complete simple games (N1, χ1) and
(N2, χ2) are called isomorphic iff there is a bijection ϕ :
N1 → N2 such that
χ1
({
u1, . . . , uk
})
= χ2
({
ϕ (u1) , . . . , ϕ (uk)
})
for all subsets {u1, . . . , uk} ⊆ N1.
2.3. A parameterization of complete simple games
with t types of voters. The crucial characterization the-
orem for complete simple games using vectors as coalitions
and the partial order  was given by Carreras and Freixas
in [4]:
Theorem 1.
(a) Given are a vector
n˜ =
(
n1 . . . nt
)
∈ Nt>0
and a matrix
M =

m1,1 m1,2 . . . m1,t
m2,1 m2,2 . . . m2,t
...
. . .
. . .
...
mr,1 mr,2 . . . mr,t
 =

m˜1
m˜2
...
m˜r

satisfying the following properties
(i) 0 ≤ mi,j ≤ nj , mi,j ∈ N for 1 ≤ i ≤ r, 1 ≤ j ≤
t,
(ii) m˜i ⊲⊳ m˜j for all 1 ≤ i < j ≤ r,
(iii) for each 1 ≤ j < t there is at least one row-
index i such that mi,j > 0, mi,j+1 < nj+1 if
t > 1 and m1,1 > 0 if t = 1, and
(iv) m˜i ⋗ m˜i+1 for 1 ≤ i < r.
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Then, there exists a complete simple game (N,χ) as-
sociated to (n˜,M).
(b) Two complete games (n˜1,M1) and (n˜2,M2) are iso-
morphic if and only if n˜1 = n˜2 and M1 =M2.
In such a vector/matrix representation of a complete simple
game, the number of voters n is determined by n =
t∑
i=1
ni.
Although Theorem 1 looks technical at first glance, the ne-
cessity of the required properties can be explained easily. Ob-
viously, nj ≥ 1 and 0 ≤ mi,j ≤ nj must hold for 1 ≤ i ≤ r,
1 ≤ j ≤ t. If m˜i  m˜j or m˜i  m˜j then we would have
m˜i = m˜j or either m˜i or m˜j cannot be a minimal win-
ner. If for a column-index 1 ≤ j < t we have mi,j = 0 or
mi,j+1 = nj+1 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ r, then we can check whether
we have gh for all g ∈ Nj , h ∈ Nj+1, which is a contra-
diction to the definition of the classes Nj and therefore also
for the numbers nj . Obviously, a complete simple game does
not change if two rows of the matrix M are interchanged.
Thus, we can require an arbitrary ordering of the rows.
In the following we will denote by cs(n, t, r) the number
of complete simple games with t ≤ n equivalence classes of
the n voters and r shift-minimal winning coalitions.
n 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
max 1 1 2 2 3 5 8 14 23 40 70 124 221 397 722
Table 1. The maximum number of shift-
minimal winning coalitions.
We would like to remark that the maximum number r
of shift-minimal winning coalitions can become quite large,
see Table 1 for the very first numbers. Their number indeed
equals
max
1≤h≤n, k
∣∣∣∣∣
{
(a1, . . . , ah) | 1 ≤ a1 < · · · < ah ≤ n,
h∑
i=1
ai = k
}∣∣∣∣∣ ,
see [25].
3. Complete simple games as lattice points in a
polytope
Now, we have a look at the vector/matrix representation
of a complete simple game from a different point of view. In
principle, for given parameters n, t, and r, a complete simple
game can be described by (r + 1)t integers fulfilling certain
conditions. If these conditions can be reformulated as linear
inequalities, complete simple games with parameters n, t,
and r are in bijection to lattice points of a certain rational
polytope, i. e. a polytope where the coordinates of all corners
are rational numbers. There is a profound theory on the
enumeration of lattice points. The most important result
is that for fixed dimension the enumeration can be done in
polynomial time in terms of the input size. We will go into
the details in the next section.
We would like to remark that for t = 1 only r = 1 is
possible and the requirements reduce to 1 ≤ m1,1 ≤ n1 = n.
Also for t = 2 one can easily give a more compact formulation
for the requirements in Theorem 1. A complete description
of the possible values n1, n2,m1,1, m1,2 corresponding to a
complete simple game with parameters n, t = 2, and r = 1
is given by
1 ≤ n1 ≤ n− 1,(1)
n1 + n2 = n,
1 ≤ m1,1 ≤ n1,
0 ≤ m1,2 ≤ n2 − 1.
For t = 2 and r ≥ 2 such a complete and compact description
is given by
1 ≤ n1 ≤ n− 1,(2)
n1 + n2 = n,
mi,1 ≥ mi+1,1 + 1 ∀1 ≤ i ≤ r − 1,
mi,1 +mi,2 + 1 ≤ mi+1,1 +mi+1,2 ∀1 ≤ i ≤ r − 1.
Thus, for t ≤ 2 we are able to describe the feasible values of
the ni and the mi,j by linear constraints.
3.1. Complete simple games as integer points in the
stable set polytope. We can easily describe complete sim-
ple games as cliques in a suitable graph as follows: Let Gn be
a graph consisting of the vertices {0, 1}n\0 where two vertices
vi, vj are joined by an edge if either vi  vj or vi  vj . The
number of (non-trivial) stable sets4 of Gn equals the number
cs(n) of complete simple games with n voters. Thus, we may
describe the set of complete simple games as integer points
of the stable set polytope of Gn. By counting the vertices of
Gn, we obtain
(3)
n∑
t=1
cs(n, t, 1) = 2n − 1.
Theorem 2.
n∑
t=1
cs(n, t, 2) = 2 · (4n + 2n) ·(
6 ·
8n− 4n2 − 3
n(n− 3)
(
2n− 5
n− 4
)
+
2n2 + 3n− 2
(n+ 1)(n− 2)
(
2n− 3
n− 3
))
Proof. We count the number of edges {u, v} of the comple-
ment Gn of Gn, where u⋗ v. Suppose that the first i coordi-
nates of u and v coincide, ui+1 = 1, and vi+1 = 0. Now let
n−j−1 be the first index such that
∑n−j−1
h=1 vh >
∑n−j−1
h=1 uh.
Thus we have un−j−1 = 0, vn−j−1 = 1, and
∑n−j−2
h=1 uh =∑n−j−2
h=1 vh. The remaining j coordinates are arbitrary. This
gives
∑n
t=1 cs(n, t, 2) =
n−3∑
i=0
n−3−i∑
j=0
2if(n−i−j−1)·4j =
n−3∑
i=0
2i
(
2i+1 − 1
)
f(n−i−1),
where f(k) counts the number of sequences u′, v′ ∈ {0, 1}k
such that
∑i
h=1 u
′
h ≥
∑i
h=1 v
′
h for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k and
∑k
h=1 u
′
h =∑k
h=1 v
′
h. If we consider only the coordinates of u
′ and v′
which differ, we obtain Dyck paths, which are counted by
4or independent sets
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the Catalan numbers. The remaining coordinates are equal
but arbitrary. Thus we get
f(k) =
⌊ k2 ⌋∑
i=1
1
i+ 1
(
2i
i
)
·
(
k − 1
2i− 1
)
· 2k−2i =
4
k + 2
(
2k − 1
k − 2
)
and apply a last time a computer algebra package like Maple
11 for the remaining summation. 
For a fixed number of voters n one can apply a software
package like cliquer [31, 32] in order to exhaustively gener-
ate all cliques of Gn. see Table 2. The corresponding values
of t and r can be easily determined for each clique separately.
n 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
cs(n) 1 3 82511711714431316175188284432730174
time 0.02 s 1.23 s 44:01 m
Table 2. Complete simple games for n voters.
3.2. Counting integer points in polytopes. In this sec-
tion we give a very short introduction into the theory of
counting integer points in polytopes. For a report on the
state-of-the-art we refer to [33] and for an accessible survey
on applications of lattice-point enumeration problems we re-
fer to [5].
In 1983 Lenstra has achieved a major breakthrough by
providing an algorithm which allows to decide whether a
given rational polytope P = {x ∈ Rm | Ax ≤ b}, i. e. where
the entries of A and b are rational numbers, contains a lat-
tice point in polynomial time for every fixed dimension m
[26]. The next breakthrough came in 1994 when Barvinok
introduced an algorithm for determining the exact number
of lattice points in a rational polytope, that runs in polyno-
mial time for every fixed dimension m [2].
Here so-called generating functions were utilized for the
counting process. We give a brief example in dimension one.
Let [a, b] be an interval with rational endpoints a and b. The
corresponding polytope is given by
P =
{
x ∈ R1 | x ≤ b, −x ≤ −a
}
.
The polynomial
(4) χ(P, x) =
∑
i∈P∩Z1
xi
is some kind of a characteristic function for the lattice points
of P , i. e. every lattice point corresponds to a monomial.
Using rational functions, even very large polytopes can be
written very compactly. Let us have an example: For a = 5
and b = 2945 we have χ(P, x) =
2945∑
i=5
xi = x5 · x
2941−1
x−1
us-
ing the geometric series. By evaluating χ(P, x) at x = 1 we
obtain the number of lattice points in P . For higher dimen-
sions polynomials and rational functions in several variables
are used. For the mathematical and algorithmic details we
refer e. g. to [3, 6].
By computing the so-called Ehrhart series of a rational
polytope P , one can even determine a formula for the num-
ber of lattice points in the dilation nP . Parts of the well
established theory on counting integer points in rational poly-
topes are rediscovered by researchers in social choice theory.
For applications in this area and an explanation of the basic
principles we refer e. g. to [27, 35].
Here, we will give an exemplary application and example
from [27]. At first we need some definitions.
Definition 11. A rational periodic number f(p) is a func-
tion Z → Q, such that there is a period q such that f(p) =
f(p′) whenever p ≡ p′ (mod q).
Ehrhart used a list of q rational numbers[
f1, . . . , fq
]
p
enclosed in square brackets to represent the periodic num-
ber f(p) = fi for p ≡ i (mod q) [8]. For a more compact
representation of periodic numbers we refer to [33].
Definition 12. A quasi-polynomial of degree m is a function
f(n) = ad(n)n
d + . . . a1(n)n+ a0(n),
where the ai are periodic numbers. The least common multi-
ple of the periods of the coefficients ai is called the period of
f .
Ehrhart’s main theorem [8] is:
Theorem 3. Let P ⊆ Qm be a rational polytope. The num-
ber of lattice points in the dilations nP with n ∈ N is given by
a degree-m quasi-polynomial where the period is a divisor of
the least common multiple of the denominators of the vertices
of P .
So let us consider the polytope P ∈ R2 given by the in-
equalities x1 + x2 ≤ 3, 2x1 ≤ 5, x1 ≥ 0, and x2 ≥ 0. The
vertices of P are given by (0, 0),
(
5
2
, 0
)
, (0, 3), and
(
5
2
, 1
2
)
.
Thus the number f(P, n) of lattice points of the polytope
nP =
{
x ∈ R2 | x1 + x2 ≤ 3n, 2x1 ≤ 5n, x1 ≥ 0, x2 ≥ 0
}
is
a quasi-polynomial of degree 2 with period 2. Indeed we
have
f(P, n) =
35
8
n2 +
[
17
4
, 4
]
n
· n+
[
1,
5
8
]
n
.
This technique was extended to so-called parametric poly-
topes, see e. g. [1, 33]. To put it in a nutshell, one can say: if
P ⊆ Rm1+m2 is a polyhedron such that for every admissible
integer vector p ∈ Zm2 of the last coordinates, P with fixed
last coordinates is a polytope, then one can compute a mul-
tivariate quasi-polynomial for the number of integer points
in P in dependence of the parameter vector p.
Thus, one aims to formulate the set of feasible points of a
counting problem via a rational polytope P .
4. Complete simple games for two types of voters
Using the linear systems of inequalities (1), (2), the the-
ory from Subsection 3.2, and the software package barvinok
[33], we were able to determine formulas for cs(n, 2, r), where
r ≤ 10. (It took less than 8 hours of computation time to
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compute cs(n, 2, 8), 63 hours for cs(n, 2, 9), and 539 hours for
cs(n, 2, 10).)
These calculations are doable for small r; however, for this
special case of t = 2 one can determine a general formula as
follows.
Lemma 1. Each complete simple game, given by
(
n1 n2
)
,m0,1 m0,2... ...
mr,1 mr,2
, with two types of voters, i. e. t = 2, and
r + 1 ≥ 2 shift-minimal winning coalitions can be written as(
r +
r−1∑
j=0
xj + yr+1 + z1 2r +
r−1∑
j=0
xj +
r∑
j=0
yj + z2
)

r +
r−1∑
j=0
xj + yr+1 0 + y0
r − 1 +
r−1∑
j=1
xj + yr+1 2 + x0 + y0 + y1
...
...
r − i+
r−1∑
j=i
xj + yr+1 2i+
i−1∑
j=0
xj +
i∑
j=0
yj
...
...
1 + xr−1 + yr+1 2r − 2 +
r−2∑
j=0
xj +
r−1∑
j=0
yj
0 + yr+1 2r +
r−1∑
j=0
xj +
r∑
j=0
yj

,
where x0, . . . , xr−1, y0, . . . , yr+1, z1, z2 are non-negative inte-
gers fulfilling
(5)
r−1∑
i=0
2xi +
r+1∑
i=0
yi + z1 + z2 = n− 3r.
Proof. For one direction, we only have to check the condi-
tions of Theorem 1 or directly check the system of linear
inequalities (2).
For the other direction, we state that one can recursively
determine the xh, yi, and zj via
y0 = m0,2,
yr+1 = mr,1,
xi = mi,1 −mi+1,1 − 1 for i = r − 1, . . . , 0,
yi = mi,2 −mi−1,2 − 2− xi−1 for i = 1, . . . , r,
z1 = n1 − r −
r−1∑
j=0
xj − yr+1, and
z2 = n2 − 2r −
r−1∑
j=0
xj −
r∑
j=0
yj .
Verifying xh, yi, zj ≥ 0 finishes the proof. 
Counting the number of solutions of Equation (5) and
determining the maximum possible r gives:
Lemma 2. For r ≥ 2 we have
cs(n, 2, r) =
⌊n−3r+32 ⌋∑
i=0
(
i+ r − 2
r − 2
)(
n− 2r − 2i+ 5
r + 2
)
.
For r = 1 we have
(6) cs(n, 2, 1) =
n3 − n
6
.
The corresponding ordinary generating functions are given
by x
2
(1−x)4
for r = 1 and by x
3r−3
(1−x)r+3(1−x2)r−1
for r ≥ 2.
Theorem 4. For all n ≥ 1 the number of complete simple
games with t = 2 equivalence classes of voters is given by
cs(n, 2) = Fibonacci(n+ 6) −
(
n2 + 4n+ 8
)
,
where Fibonacci(0) = 0, Fibonacci(1), and Fibonacci(i) =
Fibonacci(i− 1) + Fibonacci(i− 2) for i ≥ 2.
Proof. Summing up the generating functions for cs(n, 2, r)
yields
x2
(1− x)4
+
∞∑
r=2
x3r−3
(1− x)r+3(1− x2)r−1
=
x2
(1− x)4
+
x3
(1− x)5(1− x2)
∞∑
r=0
(
x3
(1− x)(1− x2)
)r
=
x2(1− x)(1− x2) + x3 · 1
1− x
3
(1−x)(1−x2)
(1− x)5(1− x2)
=
x2(1 + x)
(1− x)3(1− x− x2)
=
21x2 + 13x3
1− x− x2
−
20x2 − 31x3 + 13x4
(1− x)3
.
Since x
1−x−x2
is the generating function for the Fibonacci
numbers Fibonacci(n) and x
(1−x)3
is the generating function
for the sequence n(n+1)
2
we conclude cs(n, 2)
= 21 · Fibonacci(n− 1) + 13 · Fibonacci(n − 2)
−
20n(n− 1)− 31(n− 1)(n− 2) + 13(n− 2)(n− 3)
2
= Fibonacci(n+ 6)−
(
n2 + 4n+ 8
)
iteratively using the equation Fibonacci(i) = Fibonacci(i −
1) + Fibonacci(i− 2) for i ≥ 2. 
5. Formulas for the number of complete simple
games
In this section we will give a general algorithm in order to
determine formulas for the number cs(n, t, r) of complete sim-
ple games with respect to the number t of equivalence classes
of voters and the number r of shift-minimal winning coali-
tions. The main tool is the parametric Barvinok algorithm,
see Subsection 3.2 or [33]. It is indeed possible to express the
conditions from Theorem 1 using linear constraints, see Ap-
pendix A. Unfortunately, at least the present authors, can
manage that only by using so-called Big-M-constraints, see
e. g. [23]. The consequence is that such a formulation works
for a fixed number n of voters only.
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In order to be able to compute exact formulas depend-
ing on n we exhaustively generate a finite list of sub-cases,
which each can be modeled via a system of linear inequali-
ties without using Big-M-constraints. Let us start with the
conditions (a)(ii) and (a)(iv) of Theorem 1. Since we have to
ensure m˜i ⊲⊳ m˜j for all i < j, for each i < j there must be
integers 1 ≤ ai,j < bi,j ≤ t such that
k∑
h=1
mi,h =
k∑
h=1
mj,h ∀1 ≤ k < ai,j ,(7)
ai,j∑
h=1
mi,h >
ai,j∑
h=1
mj,h,(8)
k∑
h=1
mi,h ≥
k∑
h=1
mj,h ∀ai,j < k < bi,j , and(9)
bi,j∑
h=1
mi,h <
bi,j∑
h=1
mj,h.(10)
So, ai,j is the first index, where the partial sums of m˜i and
m˜j differ. Due to condition (a)(iv), they differ as in In-
equality (8). The next index with the partial sum of m˜i
smaller than the partial sum of m˜j is denoted by bi,j . In
total there are
(
t
2
)(r2) possibilities for the ai,j ’s and the bi,j ’s.
From (a)(iv), we conclude:
Lemma 3. For 1 ≤ i < j1 < j2 ≤ r we have ai,j1 ≥ ai,j2
and for 1 ≤ i1 < i2 < j ≤ r we have ai1,j ≥ ai2,j .
In order to ensure condition (a)(iii), assuming t > 1, we
introduce two integers 1 ≤ cj ≤ r and 0 ≤ dj < 3
cj−1 for all
1 ≤ j < t. The interpretation of these integer should be the
following: For a given column index 1 ≤ j < t, let cj be the
first row index with
(11) mcj ,j > 0 and mcj ,j+1 < nj+1.
Now, we consider the dj as numbers in base 3, i. e. we define
dˆi,j ∈ {0, 1, 2} for 1 ≤ i < cj via
(12) dj =
cj−1∑
i=1
dˆi,j · 3
i−1.
To ensure that cj is the first row index, we require
mi,j = 0 if dˆi,j ∈ {0, 2},(13)
mi,j > 0 if dˆi,j = 1,(14)
mi,j+1 = nj+1 if dˆi,j ∈ {1, 2}, and(15)
mi,j+1 < nj+1 if dˆi,j = 0(16)
for all i < cj .
Thus, we obtain a finite list of sub-cases, which are de-
scribed via the tuples(
(ai,j)1≤i<j≤r , (bi,j)1≤i<j≤r , (cj)1≤j<t , (dj)1≤j<t
)
.
In each sub-case remains a system of linear inequalities hav-
ing (r+ 1)× t variables (without any reductions), where the
number of voters n occurs only on the right hand side, whose
number of integer solutions in principal can be determined
using the parametric Barvinok algorithm.
Since the stated necessary conditions for the tuples of the
sub-cases result in a huge number of possibilities, even for
small t and r, we have to generate these tuples in a search
tree where we check whether the intermediate linear pro-
grams corresponding to the nodes of the search tree have a
solution or the requirements are contradicting, using ILOG
CPLEX 11.2. Afterwards, we run the parametric Barvinok
algorithm for each of the remaining possibilities, see Table 3.
(t, r) (3,2) (3,3) (3,4) (3,5) (4,2) (4,3) (5,2)
# 9 46 254 1680 49 1071 217
(t, r) (4,4) (5,3) (6,2) (6,3) (7,2) (8,2)
# 23666 17456 865 231081 3241 11665
Table 3. Number of remaining cases for
given t, r.
Using the described approach, we were able to determine
exact formulas for cs(n, t, r) in the cases where r ≤ 4 for
t = 3, r ≤ 3 for t = 4, and r = 2 for t = 5, see Appendix B.
6. Conclusion and open problems
We have utilized a known parameterization of complete
simple games in order to enumerate their number using the
parametric Barvinok algorithm as a subroutine, which (so
far) is indeed an obstructing bottleneck. Additionally, we
have given a short proof for a surprising formula on the num-
ber of complete simple games with two types of voters.
It would be interesting to discover an exact formula for
cs(n, 3). Going over to weighted majority games, we can ask
the same questions. In contrast to complete simple games,
the number wm(n, t) of weighted majority games with an
arbitrary but fixed number t types of voters is bounded by a
polynomial in n, e. g. one can easily show wm(n, t) < (tn)t
4
.
Maybe also an exact enumeration formula for wm(n, 2) can
be determined.
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Appendix A. Complete simple games as integer
points in polytopes
In the following, we will model the requirements of Theo-
rem 1 using linear constraints and additional binary auxiliary
variables. In order to obtain a bijection between complete
simple games and lattice points, we have to ensure that for
each complete simple games there exists exactly one alloca-
tion of the original and the auxiliary variables.
Theorem 5. For given parameters n, t, and r with t+r > 2
each complete simple game attaining these parameters bijec-
tively corresponds to a lattice point of a polytope P defined
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by the following inequalities:
n−
t∑
j=1
nj = 0(17)
nj −mi,j ≥ 0(18)
j∑
h=1
(mp,h −mq,h)− x
(1)
p,q,j + nx
(2)
p,q,j ≥ 0(19)
j∑
h=1
(mp,h −mq,h)− nx
(1)
p,q,j ≤ 0(20)
x
(1)
p,q,j + x
(2)
p,q,j = 1(21)
t∑
j=1
x
(1)
p,q,j ≥ 1(22)
mi,j′ − x
(3)
i,j′
≥ 0(23)
kx
(3)
i,j′
−mi,j′ ≥ 0(24)
mi,j′+1 − nj′+1 + x
(4)
i,j′
≤ 0(25)
nj′+1 −mi,j′+1 − kx
(4)
i,j′
≤ 0(26)
2x
(5)
i,j′
− x
(3)
i,j′
− x
(4)
i,j′
≤ 0(27)
x
(5)
i,j′
− x(3)
i,j′
− x(4)
i,j′
≥ −1(28)
r∑
i=1
x
(5)
i,j′
≥ 1(29)
mi′,j −mi′+1,j − x
(6)
i′,i′+1,j + kx
(7)
i′,i′+1,j ≥ 0(30)
mi′,j −mi′+1,j − kx
(6)
i′,i′+1,j ≤ 0(31)
mi′+1,j −mi′,j − x
(6)
i′+1,i′,j + kx
(7)
i′+1,i′,j ≥ 0(32)
mi′+1,j −mi′,j − kx
(6)
i′+1,i′,j ≤ 0(33)
x
(6)
i′,i′+1,j
+ x
(7)
i′,i′+1,j
= 1(34)
x
(6)
i′+1,i′,j + x
(7)
i′+1,i′,j = 1(35)
x
(8)
i′,j
− x
(6)
i′,i′+1,j ≤ 0(36)
t(x
(8)
i′,j
− 1) +
j∑
h=1
x
(6)
i′+1,i′,h
≤ 0(37)
x
(8)
i′,j
− x(6)
i′,i′+1,j +
j∑
h=1
x
(6)
i′+1,i′,h ≥ 0(38)
(39)
t∑
j=1
x
(8)
i′,j
≥ 1(40)
nj ∈ N>0(41)
mi,j ∈ N0(42)
x
(1)
p,q,j , x
(2)
p,q,j ∈ {0, 1},(43)
x
(3)
i,j′
, x
(4)
i,j′
, x
(5)
i,j′
∈ {0, 1},(44)
x
(6)
i′,i′+1,j , x
(7)
i′,i′+1,j , x
(6)
i′+1,i′,j , x
(7)
i′+1,i′,j ∈ {0, 1},(45)
x
(8)
i′,j
∈ {0, 1},(46)
for all 1 ≤ i ≤ r, 1 ≤ i′ ≤ r − 1, 1 ≤ j ≤ t, 1 ≤ j′ ≤ t − 1,
1 ≤ p, q ≤ r, p 6= q, where k = n− t+ 1.
Proof. In order to prove the statement, on the one hand,
we have to show that for fixed parameters n, t, r and each
complete simple game characterized by integers nj and mi,j
there exists exactly one lattice point with coordinates nj ,
mi,j , x
(⋆)
⋆ in P . On the other hand, we have to show that for
a given lattice point nj , mi,j , x
(⋆)
⋆ of P the integers nj , mi,j
fulfill the conditions of a complete simple game.
At first we remark that n˜ ∈ N>0,
t∑
j=1
nj = n, and prop-
erty (i) of Theorem 1 are equivalent to Inequalities (17), (18),
(41), and (42).
The next step is to describe the interpretation of the aux-
iliary variables:
(a) x
(1)
p,q,j = 1 iff
j∑
h=1
mp,h >
j∑
h=1
mq,h, x
(2)
p,q,j = 0 iff
j∑
h=1
mp,h >
j∑
h=1
mq,h
(b) x
(3)
i,j = 1 iff mi,j > 0
(c) x
(4)
i,j = 1 iff mi,j+1 < nj+1
(d) x
(5)
i,j = 1 iff mi,j > 0 and mi,j+1 < nj+1
(e) x
(6)
i,i+1,j = 1 iff mi,j > mi+1,j , x
(7)
i,i+1,j = 0 iff
mi,j > mi+1,j
(f) x
(6)
i+1,i,j = 1 iff mi+1,j > mi,j , x
(7)
i+1,i,j = 0 iff
mi+1,j > mi,j
(g) x
(8)
i,j = 1 iff mi,j > mi+1,j and mi,h ≥ mi+1,h for all
1 ≤ h ≤ j.
Let us assume for a moment that these seven equivalences
are valid. In this case the x
(⋆)
⋆ are uniquely determined by
nj and mi,j for 1 ≤ i ≤ r, 1 ≤ j ≤ t. Next we prove that
properties (ii)-(iv) of Theorem 1 are fulfilled for every lattice
point nj , mi,j , x
(⋆)
⋆ in P .
Due to Inequality (22), for every 1 ≤ p, q ≤ r, p 6= q
there exists at least one index j such that xp,q,j = 1. Using
interpretation (a), we can conclude that m˜p  m˜q does not
hold. Interchanging p and q yields m˜p ⊲⊳ m˜q for all p 6= q,
which is equivalent to property (ii) of Theorem 1.
If t = 1 then due to the required t + r > 2 we have r ≥ 2
and property (iv) of Theorem 1 implies m1,1 > 0, which is
equivalent to property (iii) of Theorem 1 in this case. In
the remaining cases (t > 1) due to Inequality (29), for every
1 ≤ j < t there exists at least one row-index i such that
x
(5)
i,j = 1. Using interpretation (d), we can conclude mi,j > 0
and mi,j+1 < nj+1. Thus the nj , mi,j fulfill property (iii) of
Theorem 1.
Due to Inequality (40), for each 1 ≤ i ≤ r − 1 there is
at least one 1 ≤ j ≤ t such that x(8)i,j = 1. Using inter-
pretation (g), we conclude m˜i ⋗ m˜i+1 which is equivalent to
property (iv) of Theorem 1.
ON DEDEKIND’S PROBLEM FOR COMPLETE SIMPLE GAMES 11
All that remains to prove are the seven interpretations.
Obviously we have∣∣∣∣∣
j∑
h=1
(mp,h −mq,h)
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ n,
|mi,j −mi+1,j | ≤ mi,j ≤ n− t+ 1,
and
nj −mi,j ≤ n− t+ 1.
(a) If
j∑
h=1
mp,h >
j∑
h=1
mq,h for given p, q, and j, then
due to inequalities (20) and (21) we have x
(1)
p,q,j = 1
and x
(2)
p,q,j = 0. In this case Inequality (19) is also
valid. Otherwise if
j∑
h=1
mp,h ≤
j∑
h=1
mq,h for given p,
q, and j, then due to inequality (19) and (21) we have
x
(1)
p,q,j = 0 and x
(2)
p,q,j = 1. In this case Inequality (20)
is valid, too.
(b) If mi,j > 0 then due to Inequality (24) we have
x
(3)
i,j = 1 so that Inequality (23) is also fulfilled. If
mi,j = 0 then due to Inequality (23) we have x
(3)
i,j = 0
so that Inequality (24) is also valid.
(c) If mi,j+1 < nj+1 then due to Inequality (26) we have
x
(4)
i,j = 1. If mi,j+1 = nj+1 then due to Inequality
(25) we have x
(4)
i,j = 0. In both cases, inequalities
(25) and (26) are valid.
(d) If mi,j > 0 and mi,j+1 < nj+1 we have x
(3)
i,j = 1 and
x
(4)
i,j = 1. Due to Inequality (28) we have x
(5)
i,j = 1
in this case. Otherwise we have x
(3)
i,j + x
(4)
i,j ≤ 1 and
conclude x
(5)
i,j = 0 from Inequality (27). In both cases
inequalities (27) and (28) are valid.
(e) If mi,j > mi+1,j then, due to inequalities (31) and
(34), we have x
(6)
i,i+1,j = 1 and x
(7)
i,i+1,j = 0. Other-
wise we havemi,j ≤ mi+1,j and conclude x
(6)
i,i+1,j = 0
and x
(7)
i,i+1,j = 1 from inequalities (30) and (34). In
both cases inequalities (30) and (31) are valid.
(f) Similar to (e).
(g) If mi,j > mi+1,j and mi,h ≥ mi+1,h for all 1 ≤ h ≤ j
then we have x
(6)
i,i+1,j = 1, x
(7)
i,i+1,j = 0 and x
(6)
i+1,i,h =
0, x
(7)
i+1,i,h = 1 for all 1 ≤ h ≤ j. Thus we can
conclude x
(8)
i,j = 1 from Inequality (38). If mi,j ≤
mi+1,j then we have x
(6)
i,i+1,j = 0 so that Inequality
(36) forces x
(8)
i,j = 0. If there exists an index 1 ≤ h ≤
t such that mi,h < mi+1,h then we have x
(6)
i+1,i,h = 1
and conclude x
(8)
i,j = 0 from Inequality (37). In all
cases, inequalities (36), (37), and (38) are valid.

Appendix B. Formulas for the number of complete
simple games
Lemma 4.
cs(n, 1, 1) = cs(n, 1) = n.
Lemma 5. For t ≥ 2 we have
cs(n, t, 1) =
(
n+ 1
2t− 1
)
.
Using the represented approach from Section 5 we were
able to determine the following formulas for cs(n, t, r):
cs(n, 3, 2) = 0 for n ≤ 3 and cs(n, 3, 2) =
1
26880
n8 +
13
20160
n7 −
1
2880
n6 −
43
5760
n5 −
1
2880
n4
+
23
1440
n3 +
23
5040
n2 +
[
1
70
,−
41
4480
]
n
· n+
[
0
1
,−
1
256
]
n
for n ≥ 2.
cs(n, 3, 3) = 0 for n ≤ 4 and cs(n, 3, 3) =
23
239500800
n11 +
139
87091200
n10 +
257
52254720
n9 −
107
1161216
n8
+
871
14515200
n7 +
1177
1555200
n6 −
1571
1088640
n5 −
5
6804
n4
+
[
1429
302400
,
21289
4838400
]
n
· n3 +
[
−
401
151200
,
16861
9676800
]
n
· n2
+
[
−
1
3080
,−
10393
2365440
]
n
· n
+
[
0
1
,−
451
1492992
,−
4
729
,
5
2048
,−
2
729
,−
4547
1492992
]
n
for n ≥ 2.
cs(n, 3, 4) = 0 for n ≤ 5 and cs(n, 3, 4) =
2833
16738231910400
n14 +
913
391283343360
n13 −
25733
3310859059200
n12
−
8329
41385738240
n11 −
104849
300987187200
n10 +
434377
30098718720
n9
−
3853
85730400
n8 −
56471
752467968
n7 +
10222451
18811699200
n6
+
[
−
103807
209018880
,−
1628593
3344302080
]
n
· n5
+
[
−
3612949
2874009600
,−
418954397
367873228800
]
n
· n4
+
[
3217
1451520
,
33517
23224320
]
n
· n3 +
[
−
913147
1816214400
,
484043734439
301288174387200
,−
29120107
147113366400
,
5408921719
3719607091200
,
−
51542507
147113366400
,
29964809639
301288174387200
]
n
· n2 +
[
−
197
144144
,
−
719771827
478235197440
,
80611
105080976
,−
16985027
5904138240
,
59
11675664
,
−
3197869643
4304116776960
]
n
· n+
[0
1
,−
306295
859963392
,−
2
729
,
233
131072
,
−
14
6561
,−
92287
95551488
]
n
for n ≥ 2.
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cs(n, 4, 2) = 0 for n ≤ 4 and cs(n, 4, 2) =
29
319334400
n11 +
197
58060800
n10 +
67
3870720
n9 −
793
3870720
n8
−
341
9676800
n7 +
667
345600
n6 −
73
45360
n5 −
2791
725760
n4
+
2683
604800
n3 +
[
−
41
12600
,
37283
6451200
]
n
· n2
+
[
53
9240
,−
13289
4730880
]
n
· n+
[
0
1
,−
15
4096
]
n
for n ≥ 2.
cs(n, 4, 3) = 0 for n ≤ 4 and cs(n, 4, 3) =
40441/
1506440871936000
n15 +
227
190749081600
n14
+
55447
2459495301120
n13 +
731
5748019200
n12 −
2450159
3678732288000
n11
−
494953
66886041600
n10 +
9002453
316036546560
n9 −
4213
8670412800
n8
−
36098869
188116992000
n7 +
[
623521
836075520
,
9976903
13377208320
]
n
· n6
+
[
−
63029
574801920
,−
16678043
147149291520
]
n
· n5
+
[
−
1341127
479001600
,−
157994831
61312204800
]
n
· n4
+
[
5098711
18162144000
,−
34324686997
37196070912000
]
n
· n3
+
[
12701
46569600
,
716763911
190749081600
]
n
· n2 +
[ 1711
720720
,
1108675
1721646710784
,
3809879
525404880
,−
5037829
2361655296
,
2368439
525404880
,
4724419267
1721646710784
]
n
· n+
[0
1
,−
3711109
5159780352
,
21277
20155392
,
−
631
262144
,
14
19683
,
3104635
5159780352
,−
1
1024
,−
8749957
5159780352
,
40
19683
,−
375
262144
,−
5347
20155392
,−
1934213
5159780352
]
n
for n ≥ 2.
cs(n, 5, 2) = 0 for n ≤ 5 and cs(n, 5, 2) =
1
10729635840
n14 +
37
6642155520
n13 +
1
12773376
n12
−
13
24330240
n11 −
9683
1393459200
n10 +
1637
30965760
n9
−
45539
975421440
n8 −
4961
11612160
n7 +
2741
2419200
n6 −
23
92160
n5
−
208643
95800320
n4 +
[
5293
1330560
,
272099
170311680
]
n
· n3
+
[
−
110147
23284800
,
35652461
11921817600
]
n
· n2
+
[
29
12012
,−
95765
98402304
]
n
· n+
[
0
1
,−
31
16384
]
n
for n ≥ 2.
We would like to remark, that we have numerically very-
fied the stated formulas for all n ≤ 11 via exhaustive gener-
ation.
Appendix C. Number of sub-cases for the tuples
from Section 5
For small values of t and r we have generated all feasible
tuples(
(ai,j)1≤i<j≤r , (bi,j)1≤i<j≤r , (cj)1≤j<t , (dj)1≤j<t
)
.
in a tree search, where we have solved the corresponding
intermediate integer programs using ILOG CPLEX 11.2. In
the third column of Table 4 we state their number and in the
fourth column the computation time for the search. Here
we have to remark that the implementation of this search
is highly non-optimized since the bottleneck of the overall
algorithm lies in the application of the parametric Barvinok
algorithm. To get an impression of the latter fact we have
given the (known) running times of the parametric Barvinok
algorithm on the special sub-case ai,j = 1, bi,j = 2, cj = 1,
dj = 0, the running time of the non-parametric Barvinok
algorithm on the same sub-case with n = 20, and the total
running time for the parametric Barvinok algorithm in the
last three columns of Table 4.
t r # cases barvinok
3 2 9 0s 0s 0s 1s
3 3 46 1s 19s 0s 6m
3 4 254 14s 43m 0s 91h
3 5 1680 5m 52h 1s
3 6 13474 123m 5s
4 2 49 0s 14s 0s 2m
4 3 1071 13s 222m 0s 13d
4 4 23666 12m 5s
5 2 217 1s 27m 0s 5h
5 3 17456 3m 4s
6 2 865 4s 0s
6 3 231081 31m 6m
7 2 3241 14s 2s
7 3 2679286 320m
8 2 11665 51s 9s
9 2 40825 3m 2m
10 2 139969 10m 62m
11 2 472393 36m
12 2 1574641 123m
13 2 5196313 364m
14 2 17006113 1150m
Table 4. Number of all sub-cases for given
parameters t and r.
In order to determine some more exact formulas for the
number cs(n, t, r) of complete simple games one should ex-
ploit the fact that the polytopes of the sub-cases are related,
i. e. they differ only in a few describing hyperplanes. It
should be possible to re-implement the parametric Barvinok
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algorithm for sets of similar polytopes, reusing common inter-
mediate results. Comparing the timing results of the second
last column with the third last column of Table 4, it may be
possible to deduce the special types of the counting quasi-
polynomials in each sub-case in order to determine them
using interpolation and several runs of the non-parametric
Barvinok algorithm. Here we would like to remark, that the
used implementation in some cases determines large quasi-
polynomials which are only valid for a small number, e. g. 3,
of n-values.
So finally we have to say, that our approach for the de-
termination of exact formulas for cs(n, t, r), in dependence
of the number of voters n, looks promising, but a lot of re-
search and implementational work may be needed in order
to determine some more formulas.
Appendix D. Numerical data on the number of
complete simple games
For t ∈ {3, 4} we were able to compute some further exact
values of cs(n, t), see Table 5 and Table 6.
n cs(n,3)
1 0
2 0
3 0
4 6
5 50
6 262
7 1114
8 4278
9 15769
10 58147
11 221089
12 886411
13 3806475
14 17681979
15 89337562
16 492188528
17 2959459154
18 19424078142
19 139141985438
20 1087614361775
21 9274721292503
Table 5. Known values of the number
cs(n,3) of complete simple games with 3
types of voters.
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n cs(n,4)
1 0
2 0
3 0
4 0
5 24
6 426
7 4769
8 45483
9 431440
10 4570902
11 59776637
12 1047858496
13 26000281487
Table 6. Known values of the number
cs(n,4) of complete simple games with 4
types of voters.
